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Abstract 
In recent work, Andrew T. Forcehimes and Robert B. Talisse correctly 
note that G.A. Cohen’s fact-insensitivity thesis, properly understood, is 
explanatory.  This observation raises an important concern.  If fact-insensitive 
principles are explanatory, then what role can they play in normative 
deliberations?  The purpose of my paper is, in part, to address this question.  
Following David Miller, I indicate that on a charitable understanding of Cohen’s 
thesis, an explanatory principle explains a justificatory fact by completing an 
otherwise logically incomplete inference.  As a result, the explanatory role 
such a principle plays is inseparable from its status as a (not necessarily 
successful) justificatory reason.  With this interpretation in hand, I then 
proceed to argue that Lea Ypi’s and Robert Jubb’s recent criticisms fail to 
undermine Cohen’s thesis, and that fact-insensitive principles, once discovered, 
are especially helpful for purposes of deliberation in circumstances 
characterized by changing and changeable feasibility constraints. 
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G.A. Cohen’s now seminal article ‘Facts and Principles’ (2003) defends the radical 
claim that our most fundamental normative principles are justified independently of 
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facts.1  He maintains that without fundamental, ‘fact-insensitive’ principles, we cannot 
make sense of the justificatory relationship between factual reasons and context-specific, 
action-guiding regulatory principles (Cohen 2008, 265-7). Cohen’s thesis, in his own 
words, is that “a principle can reflect or respond to a fact only because it is also a response 
to a principle that is not a response to a fact (Cohen 2008, 232).”  Understanding what 
Cohen means by this is a bit tricky, but Andrew T. Forcehimes and Robert B. Talisse have 
aptly suggested that Cohen’s thesis is best understood as an explanatory one (Forcehimes 
and Talisse 2013, 373-4) . On the assumption that some fact F supports some principle P, 
explaining why F supports P requires invoking a further principle, P*. To use Cohen’s 
own illustrative example, on the assumption that the fact ‘keeping promises is necessary 
for promisees to pursue their personal projects’ supports the principle ‘people ought to 
keep their promises’, some further principle is needed to explain the justificatory 
relationship, e.g., a principle such as ‘people should help others pursue their projects’ 
(Cohen 2008, 234-6).   
 Recognizing that fact-insensitive principles function to explain the facts justifying 
our moral commitments is essential to understanding the fact-insensitivity thesis.  
However, it also raises an important concern.  If fact-insensitive principles function as 
explanations, then do they have a role in ethical and political decision making?  
Understanding why one’s factual beliefs supports one’s principles, and thus the basis 
upon which one endorses those principles, is perhaps an important kind of 
self-knowledge, but is that all it is?  If fact-insensitive principles are merely explanatory, 
then they can have no practical role to play.               
 The purpose of the present paper is, in part, to address the above mentioned 
concern.  In the next section, I briefly explain Cohen’s thesis and the premises he 
invokes in support of it.  Drawing on David Miller (2008), I indicate that on a charitable 
understanding of the thesis, a fact-insensitive principle explains a justificatory fact by 
completing an otherwise logically incomplete inference.  If the interpretation I advocate 
is correct, then the explanatory role such a principle plays is inseparable from its status as 
a (not necessarily successful) justificatory reason.   
 With Miller’s interpretation of the fact-insensitivity thesis in hand, I then proceed 
to defend Cohen’s thesis against two criticisms, one of which challenges it on explanatory 
grounds and the other on justificatory grounds.  The first of these criticisms, authored 
by Lea Ypi (2012), attempts to convict Cohen of an infinite regress.  In reply, I argue 
that once the logical character of Cohen’s thesis is fully appreciated, it is apparent that the 
                                            
Some of the material comprising this paper was previously presented at Queen’s University’s Philosophy 
Colloquium Series.  I thank the members of my audience for their comments.  I would also like to thank 
the members of my supervisory committee - Will Kymlicka, Alistair Macleod, and Christine Sypnowich – 
for written comments, as well as two anonymous reviewers for Socialist Studies.  Finally, I acknowledge 
funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.  
1 For a revised version of his 2003 paper, see Cohen 2008, chapter 6. 
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assumptions he works with do not commit him to claiming that the force of an 
explanation always presupposes a further explanation.  The second of these criticisms, 
authored by Robert Jubb (2009), challenges Cohen on the grounds that his thesis pertains 
to the logical but not the epistemic sense of ‘grounding’.  An explanatory principle (one 
that explains why a fact is a justificatory reason for the agent who believes it), though 
needed to generate a valid argument, does not succeed in epistemically grounding a 
fact-sensitive principles unless it, i.e., the explanatory principle, and the factual premise or 
premises it serves alongside, are justified.  In reply, I argue that Jubb’s critique succeeds 
in showing that explanatory principles are not sufficient for the justification of 
fact-sensitive principles, but it does not succeed in undermining their status as necessary 
conditions for justification.  An explanatory principle is required for there to be any sort 
of inferential relationship between a factual premise and the principle it supports, and 
thus an explanatory principle is needed to produce a sound argument.      
 After addressing the above criticisms, I proceed to argue that fact-insensitive 
principles, once discovered, can be productively extracted from their explanatory setting 
and employed for purposes of deliberation.  Following Pablo Gilabert (2011), I 
acknowledge that their insensitivity to facts that constitute soft (changeable) feasibility 
constraints makes them suitable for guiding political transition.  What is more, I suggest 
that our limited epistemic abilities make insensitivity to facts that constitute putatively 
hard (unchangeable) constraints useful too.  Facts we originally took to be permanent 
sometime change unexpectedly, and when they do, fact-insensitive principles are 
important for political reform.  As we’ll see, these observations are of special interest to 
both socialists and liberal egalitarians.    
                 
1. Fact-Insensitivity and the Third Man 
 
 Put very concisely, Cohen’s thesis is that any factual reason to endorse a 
normative principle presupposes a fact-insensitive normative principle (like Cohen, I 
shall henceforth use the term ‘principle’ for short).2  Put somewhat less concisely, the 
view states that for a fact to serve as a reason to endorse a principle, it is necessary that the 
agent for whom it is a reason be committed to a further, more fundamental principle, the 
upshot of which is that any fact-supported principle cannot be an agent’s most 
fundamental principle (Cohen 2008, 232-3).  To illustrate his thesis, Cohen uses 
promise-keeping as an example.  He notes that the fact ‘keeping promises is necessary 
for promisees to pursue their personal projects’ cannot by itself serve as a reason to 
                                            
2 Cohen is careful to define what he means by the terms ‘fact’ and ‘principle’.  He stipulates that “a 
normative principle, here, is a general directive that tells agents what (they ought or ought not) to do, and a 
fact is, or corresponds to, any truth, other than (if any principles are truths) a principle, of a kind that 
someone might think reasonably supports a principle (Cohen 2008, 229).”   
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endorse the principle ‘people ought to keep their promises’.  In order for it to do so, the 
agent must believe a further principle that connects said fact to the principle it supports, 
e.g., a principle such as ‘people should help others pursue their projects.’  The 
endorsement of this further principle may or may not itself depend on a fact.  If it does, 
however, then explaining the justificatory force of this fact requires commitment to yet 
another principle.  In any such case, whether it is about promise-keeping, respecting 
property, etc., one will have to stop one’s chain of reasoning at an ultimate principle the 
endorsement of which does not depend on any fact (Cohen 2008, 234-7).  
 Cohen indicates that his thesis is grounded in three premises.  The first is that 
whenever a fact serves as a reason to endorse a principle, there is always an explanation 
for why it does so.  The second is that the explanation in question must be some further 
principle the endorsement of which is independent of the fact it explains.  Interestingly, 
Cohen himself does not provide especially compelling reasons for the reader to believe 
that these premises are plausible.  In support of the first, he offers the supposedly 
self-evident claim “that there is always an explanation for why any ground grounds what 
it grounds” (Cohen 2008, 236).  With respect to the second, he simply challenges the 
reader to try and come up with a plausible non-principle explanation for why a particular 
fact provides a reason to endorse a particular principle.  Apparently he is confident that 
no one will be able to do so.  Following David Miller (2008, 33-4), I think it is more 
effective to say that a further principle is needed in order to establish a valid argument.  
By way of example, suppose you are committed to the principle ‘selfish people should 
take measures to overcome their selfishness’.  Furthermore, suppose that the reason you 
think this is because of the fact that ‘a selfish character makes utility maximization 
infeasible’.  In order for the factual premise ‘a selfish character makes utility 
maximization infeasible’ to logically entail the principle ‘selfish people should take 
measures to overcome their selfishness’, we need a further principle to serve as a second 
premise.  A good candidate would be ‘people should maximize utility’.  Explained this 
way, it is clear why any factual reason requires an explanation.  Unless the kind of 
entailment we are interested in is specifically analytic, no single premise is capable of 
entailing a conclusion.  What is more, the premise we add will need to be a principle, for 
only a principle that says something about the significance of the fact can generate a set of 
premises that either deductively or inductively entails the conclusion.    
 The third and final premise supporting Cohen’s thesis states that one’s chain of 
justificatory reasoning actually will stop at an ultimate principle, rather than continuing 
on indefinitely.  Part of the reason Cohen thinks this is so is because he believes it is 
implausible for the reasons explaining one’s endorsement of a principle to be infinite in 
number.  If our minds are finite, then so too are the number of reasons we have for 
believing a proposition (Cohen 2008, 237).  In addition, he also claims that an infinite 
chain of reasons would violate ‘the clarity of mind requirement’, according to which his 
thesis specifically applies to those with a clear grasp of why they endorse the principles 
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that they do (Cohen 2008, 233 and 237).  This stipulation makes sense if one keeps in 
mind that Cohen’s thesis is about the doxastic explanation of belief.  He is interested in 
the beliefs that explain why an agent believes in a principle (or, in some cases, what she 
must believe in order to believe that a fact supports a principle she is nonetheless 
somewhat uncertain of).  As such, Cohen is specifically interested in cases of belief 
where a doxastic explanation is, in fact, available.  If an agent can explicitly articulate her 
reasons for endorsing a principle, then we have an available explanation.  Alternatively, 
she might hold a series of inexplicit reasons that could potentially be brought to light with 
the help of an interrogator.  If, however, she does not hold any reasons at all, or, at the 
other extreme, somehow holds an infinite regression of reasons, then there is no doxastic 
explanation available for why she endorses the principle she does.   
 In a fascinating paper entitled “Facts, Principles and the Third Man” (Ypi 2012), 
Lea Ypi presents an internal critique of Cohen’s three premises.  She argues that the 
fact-insensitivity thesis is vulnerable to a version of the ‘third man argument’, i.e., an 
argument put forward in the Platonic dialogue Parmenides which tries to demonstrate 
that Plato’s theory of forms generates an infinite regress.  In the present context, an 
infinite regress of principles is allegedly generated by two of Cohen’s claims.  The first 
claim is that there is always an explanation for why a fact grounds what it grounds.  
Cohen straightforwardly states this as his first premise, so Ypi is certainly right to 
attribute it to him.  The second claim, this time implicit in Cohen’s second premise, is 
that the explanation for a ground must be something other than the ground itself (Ypi 
2012, 200-1).  A set of claims along these lines is evidently needed for Cohen’s argument 
to take off.  It is in light of the first that the justificatory force of a factual reason requires 
explanation, and it is in light of the second that something more than an appeal to 
self-evidence is needed.  The problem arises when these assumptions are applied to 
principles and not just facts.  If an explanatory principle also requires an explanation, 
one which is more than just an appeal to self-evidence, then it seems Cohen is stuck with 
an infinite regress.  Any principle that explains a justificatory fact will itself require a 
further principle to explain it, and that further principle in turn requires yet another 
principle, etc.  There will be no non-arbitrary point at which one can stop the chain of 
explanatory reasoning (Ypi 2012, 209-13).        
 One possible reply would be to explicitly restrict the scope of the assumptions Ypi 
focuses on.  Cohen might say that they only apply to facts, though I think he would be 
hard pressed to say exactly why.  A more convincing response is available via an 
appreciation for the logical character of his thesis.  As previously noted, the reason any 
justificatory fact requires an explanation is because no factual premise can entail a 
principle by itself.  For the factual premise ‘keeping promises is necessary for promisees 
to pursue their personal projects’ to entail the principle ‘people should keep their 
promises’, we need a further premise such as ‘people should help others pursue their 
projects’ to fill the entailment gap.  But what is involved in going even further?  What 
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would constitute an explanation of the explanatory principle itself?  One possibility is to 
offer an explanation for why the agent endorses it.  This is equivalent to asking whether 
the explanatory principle is ultimate, and if it is not, then what further facts and 
principles explain why the agent takes it to be justified.  But none of Cohen’s 
assumptions prevent him from eventually terminating this explanation at an ultimate 
principle.  The claim that there is always an explanation for why a fact grounds what it 
grounds is not analogous to, and thus does not require Cohen to commit to, the claim 
that there’s always a doxastic explanation for why an agent believes a principle.  The 
former is a matter of what is logically required to complete an entailment.  The latter is 
not.   
 Suppose, however, that we are interested in something other than explaining 
endorsement.  Suppose we take endorsement of the explanatory principle for granted 
and instead ask why it explains the relevant fact’s justificatory force.  If Cohen’s 
assumptions committed him to the position that the force of an explanation always 
presupposes a further explanation, then he would indeed find himself in infinite regress 
territory.  As we have noted, an explanatory principle explains a factual premise’s 
justificatory force by completing the entailment.  Since the fact that ‘a selfish character 
makes utility maximization infeasible’ cannot logically entail a commitment to character 
reform by itself, explaining the agent’s commitment to ‘selfish people should take 
measures to overcome their selfishness’ requires an additional premise.  However, if 
Cohen’s assumptions committed him to the position that explanatory force always 
requires an explanation, then pointing to the completed entailment would not be enough.  
It would be necessary to go even further and explain how forming the entailment itself 
constitutes a successful explanation.  For example, to explain why ‘people should 
maximize utility’ (P*) explains the justificatory relationship between ‘a selfish character 
makes utility maximization infeasible’ (F) and ‘selfish people should take measures to 
overcome their selfishness’ (P), we might offer the following hypothetical principle: ‘If P* 
and F, then P’.  Of course, the explanatory force of our hypothetical principle would 
itself have to be explained with a further principle, and the force of this further principle 
would have to be explained via yet another principle, etc.  In other words, if Cohen’s 
assumptions required explaining explanatory force, he would find himself in the same 
position as Lewis Carroll’s Achilles (1895).  In his humorous dialogue, Carroll shows 
that the validity of an entailment must sometimes be taken for granted.  To do 
otherwise would invite an infinite regress, for each time we try to prove the validity of an 
entailment by adding another premise, we in turn create a new entailment that must be 
proven valid, and thus an endless chain ensues.  To avoid this regress, certain logical 
forms, e.g., inference rules such as Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens, must be accepted as 
basic, and the arguments that satisfy those forms must not require any further premises in 
order to be valid.  Thankfully, though, Cohen’s assumptions do not commit him to 
claiming that the validity of an entailment always requires a further premise.  What 
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Cohen’s thesis requires is explicating the implicit premise or premises in an otherwise 
patently invalid justification.  Adding the premise needed to turn a patently invalid 
justification into a valid one is not the same thing as rejecting the basic status of inference 
rules.      
 The last kind of explanation we might offer for an explanatory principle is one 
that explains why it functions as a ground.  This question becomes intelligible once we 
have noted that explanatory principles serve as premises in arguments.  Unlike the other 
senses of explaining an explanatory principle, Cohen’s assumptions actually do commit 
him to requiring such an explanation.  As is hopefully clear by now, though, explaining 
why a principle functions as a ground does not require an infinite regress.  If we want to 
know why a principle is a reason to endorse another principle, then we just need to figure 
out which explanatory premise or premises would form a valid argument.  Thus were 
we to be asked why the agent’s commitment to helping others pursue their projects 
entails her endorsement of a promise-keeping requirement, it would not be amiss to 
mention what we already know, namely that the agent believes the factual premise 
‘keeping promises is necessary for promisees to pursue their personal projects’.  Just as 
the non-factual premise can be invoked to explain the factual premise’s force, so too can 
the factual premise be invoked to explain the non-factual premise.   
 In summary, I’ve argued that ‘the third man argument’, though perhaps applicable 
to Plato’s theory of forms, is not an effective criticism of Cohen’s fact-insensitivity thesis.  
Of the three likely interpretations of what it means to explain an explanatory principle, 
not one forces Cohen into an infinite regress.   
 
2.  The Practical Significance of Fact-Insensitive Principles 
 
 In the previous section, I sought to explain Cohen’s fact-insensitivity thesis and to 
defend it against an alleged infinite regress.  In this section, I attempt, among other 
things, to shed light on the role of fact-insensitive principles in practical deliberation.  
Addressing this matter is important because the nature of the fact-insensitivity thesis 
encourages doubts about the practical significance of fact-insensitive principles.  As we 
have noted, the principles the thesis establishes are explanatory.  They serve to explain 
why agents endorse the fact-sensitive principles they do.  In what sense are explanatory 
principles useful for deliberation, though?  Understanding why we endorse the 
fact-sensitive principles we do is surely a good thing, but how does that understanding 
bear on the selection of fact-sensitive principles we are not yet certain about? 
 The first thing to note is that fact-insensitive principles are not just explanatory.  
This point comes to light by appreciating, once more, that they are premises in 
arguments.  Though it is true that a fact-insensitive principle functions to explain why 
one or more factual claims have the justificatory significance they do, they do so 
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specifically by completing the justification said fact or facts are premises in.  Of course, 
logically complete justifications are not always successful justifications.  As Robert Jubb 
notes, explanatory principles are needed to ‘logically ground’ fact-sensitive principles, but 
in cases where an explanatory principle is unjustified (or where the factual premise it 
serves alongside is unjustified), said principle does not suffice to ‘epistemically ground’ 
the fact-sensitive principle whose endorsement it explains, i.e., it does not suffice to give 
us good reason to accept that the fact-sensitive principle is true.  By way of example, 
Jubb points out that the principle “everyone who is evil should be killed”, in combination 
with the factual premise “all people under six feet tall are evil”, would explain the agent’s 
endorsement of a fact-sensitive principle which states “everyone under six feet tall should 
be killed (Jubb 2009, 344).”  However, it’s clear that the principle “everyone who is evil 
should be killed”, though explanatory, does not justify the (independently implausible) 
fact-sensitive principle “everyone under six feet tall should be killed”, as neither the 
explanatory principle nor the factual co-premise it serves alongside are acceptable.  The 
upshot, Jubb notes, is that a chain of reasoning that eventually terminates in a 
fact-insensitive principle explains the agent’s endorsement of, but does not necessarily 
justify, the fact-sensitive principle with which one began (Jubb 2009, 344-5).   
  Jubb’s point is well taken, but the extent to which the distinction between 
premises that logically ground a conclusion (justify it on the condition that they’re true) 
and premises that epistemically ground a conclusion (actually justify it) threatens the 
justificatory significance of fact-insensitive principles depends on whether explanatory 
principles are necessary for logical grounding of any sort, or whether they are merely 
necessary for deductive validity.  If explanatory principles are merely needed for 
deductive validity, then Jubb’s point demonstrates not only the insufficiency of 
fact-insensitive principles for justification, but their lack of necessity as well.  Since 
arguments can be sound without being deductively valid, fact-insensitive principles 
would not be needed for soundness, i.e., one might have factual premises that inductively 
support fact-sensitive principles, and no further explanatory principle(s) would be needed 
to account for this.   However, if explanatory principles are needed to generate an 
inferential relationship of any sort, then fact-insensitive principles are at least necessary 
for justification.  After all, an argument’s soundness is comprised of (a) the acceptability 
of its premises and (b) the inferential relationship between its premises and its 
conclusion, so soundness requires, at the very least, that an argument’s premises 
inductively support its conclusion, i.e., that the hypothetical truth of the premises make 
the truth of the conclusion reasonably likely.  As it becomes apparent upon reflection, 
however, a factual premise cannot even inductively support a principle without a 
non-factual co-premise to back it up.  For example, consider once more the principle 
that ‘selfish people should take measures to overcome their selfishness’.  This time, 
though, let us say that the factual premise offered in support of it is the fact that ‘a selfish 
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character is one of the factors that can potentially impede utility promotion’.  Without a 
non-factual co-premise, the above fact provides no inferential support of any kind for the 
above principle.  To invoke it in argument would be a complete non-sequitur.  Some 
further principle is needed to produce an inference, and though one which supplies 
deductive logical grounding would do, e.g., one that states ‘people should remove all 
factors that can potentially impede utility promotion’, so too would one that supplies 
inductive grounding.  For instance, the principle ‘people should promote utility’ suffices 
to tell us why the agent has reason to remove potential barriers to utility promotion, but it 
does not generate a deductively valid argument.  The possibility that selfishness does not 
impede utility in some contexts, or that there may be other, more significant barriers that 
should be removed instead, demonstrates that the hypothetical truth of the premises ‘a 
selfish character is one of the factors that can potentially impede utility promotion’ and 
‘people should promote utility’ supports but fails to guarantee the conclusion ‘selfish 
people should take measures to overcome their selfishness’.       
 Once the justificatory indispensability of fact-insensitive principles is appreciated, 
it is clear that nothing prevents exporting a plausible fact-insensitive premise to 
non-explanatory contexts, i.e., contexts where the project is to select new fact-sensitive 
principles, rather than to explain the appeal of those already endorsed.  For instance, the 
principle ‘people should help others pursue their projects’, though initially of interest 
because it explains the justificatory force of the fact that ‘keeping promises is necessary 
for promisees to pursue their personal projects’, would presumably make a contribution 
to one’s moral deliberations after its discovery.  Someone committed to this principle 
might, upon reflection, find that it supports revising the norms she currently lives by, e.g., 
supports giving more to charity, voting for left wing political parties instead of right wing 
ones, etc.  The extent of her discovery’s revisionary significance will depend on the 
weight she assigns it and the degree to which it conflicts with the other commitments 
governing her norms, but it could and should make some difference to how she lives her 
life.    
 In recent work, Pablo Gilabert explores considerations related to political 
transition that shed further light on the practical significance of fact-insensitive principles 
(2011).  He points out that an appreciation for the malleability of some feasibility 
constraints requires that we take a ‘transitional standpoint’ with respect to the 
implementation of a fact-insensitive ideal.  One of his insights for Cohen’s work is that 
implementing a fundamental principle is not simply a matter of adopting action-guiding 
principles that reflect feasibility constraints and the requirements of other fundamental 
principles.  It also requires paying attention to the ways in which our actions can affect 
our social and political context, and thus the ways in which they can affect the feasibility 
of realizing more desirable arrangements in the future (Gilabert 2011, 59-63).  The other 
insight is that principles the content of which is not beholden to facts comprising soft 
feasibility constraints, i.e., malleable constraints such as culture, prevailing political views, 
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etc., have an important practical role to play.  Were we to amend the content of our 
most fundamental principles in order to ensure that what they prescribe does not exceed 
the bounds of what is feasible within our present context, then we would have no 
standard in light of which to identify which of our factual circumstances pose a barrier to 
realizing states of affairs even more desirable than those presently accessible.  Our 
principles would be beholden to, rather than critical of, the facts that constrain what is 
immediately possible to accomplish, and thus would be unable to serve as a standard in 
light of which to conduct a gradual process of transition.   
 Cohen expresses thoughts similar to Gilabert’s in his earlier writing on analytic 
Marxism.  When reflecting upon the failure of the Soviet Union and its depressing 
implications for the future of socialism, Cohen argues that socialists should not conclude 
that capitalism, because apparently more feasible, is therefore more desirable.  To do so 
would be akin to forming adaptive preferences, and though adaptive preferences are 
psychologically useful insofar as they help us cope with our limited capacities, they can 
also make us lose sight of what’s valuable (Cohen 1995, pp. 253-5).  On Cohen’s view, a 
successful socialist society would embody a number of fundamental values much better 
than a capitalist society does; values such as justice and community (Cohen 1995, pp. 
259-64; Cohen 2009, pp. 12-45).  And though a successful socialist society is not 
presently within reach, we should be careful not to forget why it was worth striving for 
one in the first place.  As Cohen puts it, “If you cannot bear to remember the goodness 
of the goal that you sought and which is not now attainable, you may fail to pursue it 
should it come within reach, and you will not try to bring it within reach (Cohen 1995, p. 
256).”  Which facts pose a barrier to bringing about socialism is a debatable matter, but 
it seems clear that capitalist market relations cultivate social attitudes that aren’t 
conducive to socialist reforms.  In so far as implementing socialism requires a strong 
sense of communal care between citizens, the transition will be difficult if citizens have 
been socialized into adopting an individualistic mentality focused on the acquisition of 
personal wealth.  Implementing socialism thus arguably requires a change in social 
attitude, one that could perhaps be accomplished through moral education.    
 Gilabert’s analysis shows how principles insensitive to soft feasibility constraints 
are useful, but it does not show how principles that are also insensitive to hard feasibility 
constraints are useful.  What practical role might principles insensitive to even 
permanent features of the human condition play?  Though I do not pretend to have a 
comprehensive answer to this question, at least some of the importance of fact-insensitive 
principles is derivable from our epistemic limitations.  We are not always able to 
determine which constraints are hard and which are soft.  Technological and other 
advancements sometimes overturn the facts constituting a putatively hard constraint.  
In situations where a set of factual constraints are lifted, it may be the case that previously 
optimal fact-sensitive principles cease to be so.  To be cognizant of this, however, 
requires an understanding of what one found appealing about those principles, an 
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understanding that survives factual change and enables one to perceive that the formerly 
optimal principles now fall short.   
 Consider the implications of emerging genetic technology.  This sort of 
technology, once it has reached a sufficiently advanced state, will predictably have the 
power to enhance human physical and mental abilities far beyond the present norm.  
This possibility raises questions of justice, among other things.3  In the contemporary 
distributive justice literature, egalitarian theorists have generally considered it to be a 
hard fact that governments cannot influence the distribution of natural abilities.  
Nevertheless, they recognize that justice requires addressing natural inequalities.  Some 
theorists, such as Cohen, think that unequal natural ability is an intrinsic source of 
unfairness (Cohen 1989, 917-8).4  Others, such as Ronald Dworkin and Kok-Chor Tan, 
think it is only unfair insofar as it is permitted to affect individuals’ access to social goods 
(Dworkin 2000, 79-90; Tan 2008, 671-3 and 679-80).  Whether one thinks unequal 
natural abilities are intrinsically or merely extrinsically unfair matters little for political 
practice if only social goods fall within the scope of government influence.  If natural 
abilities can be affected, however, then a seemingly arcane dispute over the precise nature 
of their unfairness suddenly carries much more practical significance.  For one who 
thinks natural inequality is intrinsically unfair, improvements in genetic technology 
would be a reason to adopt principles that target more than just the distribution of social 
goods.  In so far as certain ability-boosting genetic interventions are morally acceptable, 
considerations of fairness may suffice to ground a principle that gives priority to boosting 
the abilities of the disadvantaged.  Noticing this, however, requires clarity about why 
one supports addressing natural inequalities via the redistribution of social goods in the 
first place.  If it is merely because one thinks the effect of natural inequality on the 
distribution of social goods should be either mitigated or eliminated, then the emergence 
of new genetic technology is seemingly unimportant.  If, however, it is because one 
thinks natural inequality is unfair in part due to its social effects but also in and of itself, 
then the facts associated with technological advancement become normatively significant.  
Only when we are clear about the content of the principles that explain our fact-sensitive 
commitments can we react appropriately to factual change. 
 In conclusion, I hope to have demonstrated that understanding the explanatory 
character of Cohen’s thesis in terms of what is logically required for either an inductively 
or deductively valid inference empowers said thesis to avoid a number of difficulties, 
namely infinite regress and practical impotence.  Though Cohen’s thesis may still be 
vulnerable to other difficulties not mentioned here, it is my hope that a proper 
                                            
3 For a stimulating book discussing various issues surrounding justice and genetic modification, see 
Buchanan et al., 2000. 
4 In addition to holding it himself, Cohen attributes this view (perhaps improperly) to Rawls.  See Cohen 
2008, 96-7. 
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understanding of it will help commentators hone in on the real issues, whatever those 
may be.5     
 
 
References Cited 
 
Buchanan, Allen., Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler.  2000. From 
Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Carroll, Lewis.  1895.  “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”.  Mind 4, no. 14: 278-80. 
 
Cohen, G.A.  1989.  “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”.   Ethics 99, no. 4: 
906-44. 
 
Cohen, G.A. 1995. “The Future of a Disillusion”.   In Self Ownership, Freedom, and 
Equality, eds. G.A. Cohen, Jon Elster, and John Roemer.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  Pp. 245-65. 
 
Cohen, G.A.  2003.  “Facts and Principles”.  Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, no. 3: 
211-45. 
 
Cohen, G.A.  2008.   Rescuing Justice and Equality.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Cohen, G.A. 2009.  Why Not Socialism?  Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Dworkin, Ronald.  2000.  “Equality of Resources”.  In Sovereign Virtue: The Theory 
and Practice of Equality, by Ronald Dworkin.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  Pp. 65-119. 
 
Forcehimes, Andrew T. and Robert B. Talisse.  2013.  “Clarifying Cohen: A Response 
to Jubb and Hall”. Res Publica 19, no. 4: 371-9. 
 
                                            
5 According to Forcehimes and Talisse, the issue worth addressing is whether Cohen’s thesis, if true of 
moral beliefs, must also be true of the correct set of moral principles, assuming there is a correct set.  This 
may indeed be a matter worthy of exploration.  See Forcehimes and Talisse 2013, 379.  For other 
allegedly serious issues, see David Miller 2008; Thomas Pogge 2008; Daniel Kofman 2012; and Kai Nielsen 
2012.   
185
 JOHANNSEN: Explanation and Justification 
 
Gilabert, Pablo.  2011.  “Debate: Feasibility and Socialism”.  The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 19, no. 1: 52-63. 
 
Jubb, Robert.  2009.  “Logical and Epistemic Foundationalism about Grounding: the 
Triviality of Facts and Principles”.  Res Publica 15, no. 4: 337-53. 
 
Kofman, Daniel.  2012.  “How Insensitive: Principles, Facts and Normative Grounds in 
Cohen’s Critique of Rawls”.  Socialist Studies 8, no. 1: 246-66.   
 
Miller, David.  2008.  “Political Philosophy for Earthlings”.  In Political Theory: 
Methods and Approaches, eds. David Leopold and Marc Stears.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  Pp. 29-48. 
 
Nielsen, Kai.  2012.  “Rescuing Political Theory from Fact-Insensitivity”.  Socialist 
Studies 8, no. 1:216-45. 
 
Pogge, Thomas.  2008.  “Cohen to the Rescue!” Ratio 21, no. 4: 454-75.   
 
Tan, Kok-Chor.  2008.   “A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism”.  The Journal of 
Philosophy 105, no. 11: 665-90. 
 
Ypi, Lea.  2012.  “Facts, Principles and the Third Man”.  Socialist Studies 8, no. 1: 
196-215. 
 
186
